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Abstract
Modern criminal investigators face an increasing number of computer-related
crimes that require the application of digital forensic science. The major challenge facing
digital forensics practitioners is the complicated task of acquiring an understanding of the
digital data residing in electronic devices. Currently, this task requires significant
experience and background to correctly aggregate the data their tools provide from the
digital artifacts. Most of the tools available present their results in text files or tree lists. It
is up to the practitioner to mentally capture a global understanding of the state of the
device at the time of seizure and find the items of evidentiary interest. This research
focuses on the application of Information Visualization techniques to improve the
analysis of digital forensic evidence from Microsoft Windows memory captures. The
visualization tool developed in this work presents both global and local views of the
evidence based on user interactions with the graphics. The resulting visualizations
provide the necessary details for verifying digital artifacts and assists in locating
additional items of relevance. This proof-of-concept model can be modified to support
various digital forensic target platforms including Mac OS X, Linux, and Android.
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WINDOWS MEMORY FORENSIC DATA VISUALIZATION

I. Introduction
Criminal investigations in the modern era frequently involve digital forensic
science to analyze potential digital evidence obtained from electronic devices. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) regularly investigates offenses such as Computer
and Network Intrusions, Identity Theft, as well as cases involving Child Pornography
(FBI, 2014). As computer technology advances, devices continue to increase their storage
capacity and processing power effectively enlarging digital forensic evidence collections.
Research by Beebe and Clark (2005) calls for improvement to the digital investigation
process citing the rising temporal factor associated with digital evidence analysis. Data
mining techniques involving predictive modeling and content retrieval are discussed as
potential enhancements to the analysis process. Data mining employs methods from
various fields including artificial intelligence, machine learning, pattern recognition, and
data visualization (Beebe & Clark, 2005).
The applied science of Information Visualization offers unique solutions for
gaining an intuitive understanding of large and complex datasets. Information
Visualization (InfoVis) methods have led to innovative problem solving in numerous
fields including medicine (Faisal, et al, 2013), business, and computer science (Liu, et al,
2014). Such methods could provide a fresh approach for Digital Forensic Analysts
tackling the complexity of understanding large datasets.
Keim (2002) points out the significance of involving human interaction in the data
exploration process by blending “the flexibility, creativity, and general knowledge of the
1

human with the enormous storage capacity and the computational power of today’s
computers.” An advantage to employing a visual approach to analysis lies in the fact that
exploration is instinctive. The human user (analyst) does not need to grasp complex
mathematical or statistical concepts to successfully locate data of interest (Keim, 2002).
1.1

Problem Overview
The constant increase in electronic device storage capacity results in greater

workloads for forensic analysts which expands the target space containing relevant digital
evidence. Consequently the time required to properly analyze the collected data, identify
relevant digital artifacts, and extract digital evidence increases exponentially. In
summary, investigators face an uphill battle due to the substantial increase in the size of
individual digital forensic data collections. The added complexity increases the time
required to complete forensic analysis using traditional methods.
Although the majority of investigatory efforts focus on the data in disk storage,
information recovered from volatile memory can provide unique insight into the state of
the device at the time of acquisition (Cai, et al, 2013). Data regarding open ports and
sockets provides an examiner with the state of network communications on the target
system. The listing of open file handles and system registry keys relates the various
resources in disk storage accessed by each system process. Knowledge of the resources
associated with a particular process can assist in identifying key data being exfiltrated by
malware on an infected system.
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1.2

Research Motivation
The motivation behind this research stems from the growing need to develop

innovative methods to aid in digital forensic analysis. One proposed method involves the
application of Information Visualization techniques to provide a unique perspective on
collection datasets (Osborne, 2012). According to Osborne, InfoVis tools have the
potential to “aid in the discovery of new pieces of information, decision-making based on
data, and to provide explanation of certain phenomena existent within the data set.”
1.3

Research Objectives
The overall goal of this research is to develop a proof-of-concept interactive

visualization for analysis of forensic memory images. Shneiderman (1996) outlines seven
tasks for developing Information Visualization tools listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Seven Tasks for Information Visualization (Shneiderman, 1996).
Task

Description

Overview

Gain an overview of the entire collection.

Zoom

Zoom in on items of interest.

Filter

Filter out uninteresting items.

Details-on-Demand

Select an item or group and get details when needed.

Relate

View relationships among items.

History

Keep a history of actions to support undo, replay, and progressive
refinement.

Extract

Allow extraction of sub-collections and of the query parameters.

The specific objectives for this research are derived from this list and outlined as follows:
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1. The visualization tool should provide an interactive global view of the data
output from forensic memory image analysis tools.
2. The visualization tool should have the ability to filter the datasets for a
particular system and visually represent the following associations:


The relationship between each process and its associated resources.



The relationship between a system resource and its associated
processes.

3. The visualization tool should assist the user in locating unique patterns and
information of relevance within the datasets.
1.4

Methodology
Chapter 3 presents the process for obtaining forensic memory captures from

Windows machines and the methodology for extracting digital artifacts from forensic
memory captures. The two types of malware implemented on the test machines are
discussed on a behavioral level. The second part of the chapter presents a functional
overview of the developed visualization tool interface. The basic features of the software
are discussed which include the global system view and the local view of the system
which is obtained through user interactions. The last feature of the visualization tool
involves the addition of visual links to connect resources and associated processes to
assist the user in locating unique patterns and information of significance within the
digital forensic dataset.
Chapter 4 describes the application of the developed visualization tool to eight
test datasets acquired from Windows XP forensic memory images. The images include
4

five trusted images and three images infected with a form of malware. The visual results
from each of the datasets are analyzed and evaluated against the research objectives to
verify whether each of the three goals is successfully met.
1.5

Research Implications
This thesis study is unique because there has been very little published regarding

the application of Information Visualization techniques to Digital Forensic Analysis,
particularly in the sub-field of Memory Forensics. The visualization tool developed
through this research is shown to provide a level of assistance in the recognition of
existing patterns and the discovery of significant items within the test datasets.
Visualization could lead to an entirely fresh approach for Digital Forensic Investigations
by empowering digital forensic practitioners with the ability to quickly perform analysis
and gain an intuitive understanding of the target system at the time of seizure.
1.6

Summary
This chapter discusses the challenges facing digital forensic investigators

concerning the rising time frames required to analyze collection datasets that continue to
grow in size and complexity. The problem overview is stated including the importance of
volatile memory analysis. The research motivation describes the need to develop
innovative methods to assist investigators in the digital forensic analysis process. An
Information Visualization approach is selected as a means of improving the digital
forensic process. Three specific objectives for the research are listed and a basic
methodology is outlined.

5

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the digital forensic investigation process and
introduces the subfield of Forensic Memory Analysis. The chapter also presents the
significance of memory analysis, image acquisition methods, and memory analysis tools.
The subject of Information Visualization is explored as a possible solution for
overcoming digital forensic challenges and available InfoVis tools are discussed.
Chapter 3 outlines the methodology for obtaining forensic memory captures from
Windows RAM images and the process for extracting digital artifacts using available
open-source tools. The chapter also provides a functional overview of the visualization
tool interface developed in this research. Chapter 4 performs analysis using the
visualization tool on eight test datasets obtained from Windows XP Random-Access
Memory (RAM) captures. The results are evaluated against the three research objectives
for verification.
The final chapter draws conclusions regarding the results of the research, and
highlights the overall accomplishments of this study. Future research is proposed to
improve upon the design implemented in the D3 JavaScript Visualization Tool.

6

II. Literature Review

Due to the recent rise of computer crime, Digital Forensic Science has become an
important subject for Law Enforcement Investigators. This chapter presents the process
of digital forensics and highlights the specific field of Forensic Memory Analysis.
Techniques for collecting Windows memory dumps are discussed along with available
open-source tools for digital memory artifact extraction. The research presented in this
paper focuses on overcoming the challenges related to digital forensic analysis through
the application of Information Visualization. Previous related research is discussed and a
popular visualization tool is explored.
2.1

Digital Forensics
Cyber Crimes involving digital evidence are routinely investigated by law

enforcement agencies. This field of analysis is commonly referred to as digital forensics,
or digital forensic science. According to the United States Computer Emergency
Readiness Team (US-CERT) digital forensics is defined as “the discipline that combines
elements of law and computer science to collect and analyze data in a way that is
admissible as evidence in a court of law” (US-CERT, 2008).
There are various subdivisions of digital forensics that are generally categorized
under the following fields:
1. Computer Forensics – the preservation, identification, extraction, documentation
and interpretation of computer data (Kruse & Heiser, 2002).
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2. Mobile Forensics – the analysis of digital evidence obtained from devices such as
smartphones, cellphones, and PDAs (NIST, 2007).
3. Network Forensics – the analysis of data collected from active computer network
traffic to assist with intrusion detection, auditing, and monitoring (Palmer, 2001).
4. Database Forensics – the study of databases and their associated metadata (Yadav,
2011).
A commonly held standard model of the digital forensics process comprising
seven separate stages was developed by the Digital Forensic Research Workshop
(Palmer, 2001). The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) currently follows the digital
forensic model outlined below (Carroll, et al, 2008):
1. Obtaining and Imaging Forensic Data
2. Forensic Request
3. Preparation/Extraction
4. Identification
5. Analysis
6. Forensic Reporting
7. Case Level Analysis

Figure 1. Digital Forensic Process (Carroll, et al, 2008).
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The visualization method described in Chapter 3 relates to the Analysis phase of the DOJ
digital forensics process. Before analysis can be performed, collection of appropriate data
must occur. For this reason, the collection and examination of digital evidence is
discussed here.
2.2

Sources of Digital Evidence
Digital evidence is defined by the Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence

(SWGDE) as “[i]nformation of probative value that is stored or transmitted in a binary
form” (SWGDE, 2011). Computer hardware components which contain storage devices
and have the potential to contain digital evidence include (NIJ, 2008):


Hard Drives – Internal and External



Removable Media – CDs, DVDs, Floppy Disks



USB Thumb Drives



Memory Cards – Secure Digital (SD) Cards, Compact Flash Cards



Handheld Devices – Smartphones, PDAs, Tablets, Digital Media Devices
(Cameras, mp3 Players, iPods, etc.)

Disk forensics collection methods applied to these devices can provide file-system data
such as stored files and installed applications. Device physical memory can contain a
wealth of information not found elsewhere (Carvey, 2009) but is omitted from this list.
This is due to the volatile nature of memory where forensic collection requires careful
measures to be taken in order to avoid altering the current state. Most incident response
plans include the collection of volatile data (NIST, 2006).

9

2.3

Volatile Memory Forensics
Memory forensics involves analyzing a static memory image in order to

determine the current state of the target system. This can be compared to taking a
snapshot of the system memory for a particular instant in time. Live computer systems
contain volatile data stored in Random-Access Memory (RAM). If power is no longer
supplied to the system, the data stored in RAM is lost. Valuable information such as
network connections, command history, and active process information resides solely in
RAM (Carvey, 2009). Unique forensic artifacts relating to malware and rootkits reside in
memory and cannot be discovered through hard disk forensic analysis (Davis, 2008). For
this reason, the application of memory forensics techniques is critical to obtaining key
digital evidence.
2.4

Memory Acquisition
Before digital evidence can be obtained from the volatile memory, forensic

examiners must acquire a physical memory dump (image) from the target device. For the
purposes of this research, all target machines studied utilize the Microsoft Windows XP
operating system. Therefore this section discusses the available tools and methods for
extracting the contents of physical memory from Windows XP computer systems.
Methods of volatile memory acquisition are categorized as either hardware-based or
software-based and are discussed in the following sections.
2.4.1

Hardware-Based Acquisition

A PCI expansion card called the Tribble was designed as a proof-of-concept
device capable of accessing the contents of physical memory on a target computer
10

(Carrier, 2004). The acquisition is performed solely through hardware interaction without
the need for software to be loaded onto the target. Unfortunately this method requires the
Tribble card to be connected to the intended system prior to an event warranting forensic
examination. For this reason, the Tribble is impractical for use in digital forensic
investigations.
Currently the most popular hardware-based option for live memory acquisition on
Windows XP systems involves the use of an external Firewire (IEEE 1394) device. This
method essentially bypasses the operating system because Firewire specifications allow
client devices to directly access the host system’s memory (Burdach, 2006). An
advantage to this technique is the high-speed data transfer rate (approximately 800
Mbit/sec) obtained through a Firewire connection.
2.4.2

Software-Based Acquisition

There are many software-based approaches to volatile data collection which are
compatible with the Windows XP operating system. Similar to the /dev/mem device in
Unix operating systems, Windows XP provides RAM access by means of an object
device (\\.\PhysicalMemory). The Unix based data dumper tool (dd) and the various open
source versions ported for Windows systems have the ability to read from these memory
devices and output the data to a local image file (Garnet, 2013). An additional option of
dd allows the output file to be written to a server on the network (Carrier, 2004). Other
open source tools for volatile memory acquisition similar to dd include Nigilant32,
Win32dd, and Memoryze (Carvey, 2009). Win32dd was selected for use in this
research as described in Chapter 3.
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The fundamental disadvantage of memory image collection using software-based
approaches relates to the modifications to the system state due to the collection program
interactions with the operating system. Software used to extract the image has to be
loaded into memory, thereby modifying data currently stored in RAM (Davis, 2008). A
similar issue relates to the operations performed by the kernel during the acquisition
process. Processor activity that occurs parallel to the collection process affects the output
image and potentially overwriting digital evidence artifacts (Carvey, 2009).
Unfortunately, with a software-based approach utilizing the system kernel is essential due
to processor scheduling and the movement of data to storage (Carrier, 2004).
2.5

Memory Dump Extraction Tools
The third phase of the DOJ digital forensics process model relates to the

examination of collected data. With respect to memory forensics, this stage involves the
application of forensic tools on raw memory dumps in an effort to extract digital evidence
artifacts.
2.5.1

Volatility Framework

Volatility is an open source advanced memory forensics framework released
under the GNU General Public License. The framework is written in the Python scripting
language and designed to analyze RAM dumps and extract specific digital artifacts. A
variety of operating systems are supported including Windows, Linux, Mac OS X, and
Android. The modular design of Volatility allows for the support of future operating
systems and architectures. The Volatility Project community is comprised of researchers
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and professionals operating in the fields of malware analysis, incident response, and
digital forensics (Volatility, 2013).
Members of the community develop individual module plugins for the framework
and submit them to the project for general use. Plugins are organized into the following
categories:


Image Identification



Processes and DLLs



Process Memory



Kernel Memory and Objects



Networking



Registry



Crash Dumps, Hibernation, and Conversion



File System



Miscellaneous
Table 2 lists some of the most common modules designed for the Windows

family of operating systems included in the most recent Volatility release (version 2.3.1).
These are subsequently used in the research detailed in Chapter 3.
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Table 2. Volatility (2.3.1) modules for Windows.
Module Plugin

Description

imageinfo

Display identified operating system, service pack, and
architecture

connections

Lists the TCP connections active at the time of memory
acquisition

handles

Lists the open handles for all processes

pslist

List the active processes of the system

sockets

Lists the listening network sockets for any protocol

Analysis of physical memory images requires the identification of kernel
structures and their specific locations. For Windows operating systems this involves
obtaining the appropriate symbol files from the Microsoft Symbol Server (Microsoft,
2014). These symbol files must then be converted to a format that can be interpreted by
the Volatility framework. Volatility includes a bundle of prebuilt profiles for most
Windows operating systems containing the appropriate symbol files relevant to the OS
and particular architecture in a format the software can interpret (Volatility, 2013).
The current release of Volatility (2.3.1) executes from a Windows command
prompt using a standalone executable (see Figure 2). Plugin modules are run by
following the command format below:
“volatility-2.3.1.standalone .exe” vol.py –f [path to memory dump]
--profile=[OSprofile] [module]
The output can also be saved to a text file:
“volatility-2.3.1.standalone .exe” vol.py –f [path to memory dump]
--profile=[OSprofile] [module] > [path/filename].txt
14

Figure 2. Volatility Command Prompt in Windows.

2.5.2

Compiled Memory Analysis Tool (CMAT)

The Compiled Memory Analysis Tool (CMAT) is an alternative open source
utility capable of analyzing and extracting data from Windows RAM dump images.
CMAT is developed using C++ in contrast to the Volatility Framework which uses
Python. CMAT also requires access to the appropriate program database (PDB) symbol
files from the Microsoft Symbol Server to identify the appropriate kernel structures and
locations (Okolica & Peterson, 2011). Unlike Volatility, CMAT automatically obtains the
correct symbol files from the Microsoft Symbol Server directly and does not require
formatting.
CMAT is executed from a command prompt in Windows (see Figure 3) using the
following command format:
cmat.exe [dumpfile name] -data [path for output files]

Output from CMAT is organized into six feature files as listed in Table 3.

15

Figure 3. CMAT Command Prompt in Windows.
.
Table 3. CMAT Output Feature Files.
Feature
File

Data

Details

1

Process Information

Process IDs, Process Names, User IDs

2

Network Information

Network connections active at time of
memory acquisition

3

Process Loaded Modules

Loaded modules by Process ID

4

Process File Handles

Open Files by Process ID

5

Process Registry Keys

Registry Keys by Process ID

6

System Loaded Modules

System Drivers by Name

The feature files are placed in the specified output path. Figure 4 provides an example of
the feature file contents.
16

180
180
180
180
180
180
180
180
180
180
180
180
180
180
180

svchost.exe
kernel32.dll
ADVAPI32.dll
RPCRT4.dll
Secur32.dll
ShimEng.dll
AcGenral.DLL
USER32.dll
GDI32.dll
WINMM.dll
ole32.dll
msvcrt.dll
OLEAUT32.dll
MSACM32.dll
VERSION.dll

C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe
C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\ADVAPI32.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\RPCRT4.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\Secur32.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\ShimEng.dll
C:\WINDOWS\AppPatch\AcGenral.DLL
C:\WINDOWS\system32\USER32.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\GDI32.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\WINMM.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\ole32.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\msvcrt.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\OLEAUT32.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\MSACM32.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\VERSION.dll

Figure 4. CMAT Feature File Contents.

2.6

Forensic Data Analysis
The Analysis phase of the NIST digital forensic process occurs after all relevant

data is extracted from the target device. Forensic Analysts tackle the difficult task of
inspecting the various tables of extracted data in an attempt to gain a perspective on the
state of the system at the time of memory acquisition. In many cases, the objective is to
discover hidden activity or unusual phenomena in the extracted datasets.
2.6.1

Information Visualization

One proposed method of improving the Analysis process involves applying
Information Visualization techniques to the forensic data. Humans tend to comprehend
raw data more efficiently when it is presented in a visual form. Research has shown that
people possess the skills to “visually interpret and comprehend pictures, video, and charts
much faster than reading a textual description of the same” (Teerlink & Erbacher, 2006).
17

Shneiderman (1996) notes the human ability to “scan, recognize, and recall images
rapidly” in addition to the natural capacity for identifying “changes in size, color, shape,
movement, or texture.”
Ware (2004), a leading researcher in the applied science of Information
Visualization, lists the following advantages to utilizing InfoVis:


Visualization provides an ability to comprehend huge amounts of data.



Visualization allows the perception of emergent properties that were not
anticipated.



Visualization often enables problems with the data itself to become immediately
apparent. A visualization commonly reveals things not only about the data itself,
but about the way it is collected.



Visualization facilitates understanding of both large-scale and small-scale features
of the data.



Visualization facilitates hypothesis formation.
2.6.2

EIC Process

The Explore, Investigate, and Correlate (EIC) process (Osborne, 2012) stems
from recent research applying Information Visualization to digital forensics. The process
consists of a set of methods to overcome the issue of comprehending large and complex
digital forensic datasets.
The specific goals of the EIC process model are as follows:


Make the evidence visible.



Reduce the relative size of the evidence.
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Provide high-level overviews of the evidence first.



Aid in the presentation of the events and relationships in the evidence.



Provide explanations of the origin or significance of evidence.



Provide support to help identify items of probative value.



Facilitate the presentation of these findings to other investigators or in
court.

In the Explore phase the human user is presented with a high-level overview of
the data in its entirety. Through interactions with the visualization the user Investigates
the data by applying filters or specifying a focus. The Correlate phase presents a lowlevel view which highlights specific relationships within the data as well as behavior
patterns. Figure 5 provides a flow-chart diagram of the EIC Process. The research did not
include the development of new visualization methods, but instead focused on applying
established techniques that are simplistic in nature.
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2.7

Visualization Tools
Many tools exist for creating interactive visualization based on large datasets. Due

to limited funding for this research the software packages explored in this section are
limited to open-source libraries. Two of the most popular options are discussed here.
2.7.1

Gephi Visualization Software

The Gephi software package is capable of providing interactive graphical
visualizations of complex datasets (Gephi, 2014). Gephi is especially helpful in
presenting network data with various hierarchical and clustering characteristics (Bastian,
et al, 2009). The software is written in Java and utilizes the OpenGL library for rendering
graphical content. Figures 6 provides an example of a weighted network visualization
using Gephi illustrating the co-appearance of characters in the novel Les Miserables.

Figure 6. Co-Appearance of Characters in Les Miserables (Gephi, 2014).
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Another example of Gephi visualization is shown in Figure 7 below which depicts
Twitter network data.

Figure 7. Twitter Network Visualization (Gephi, 2014).

2.7.2

D3 JavaScript Visualization

Data-Driven Documents (D3) is a JavaScript library designed to manipulate
interactive data through Hyper-Text Markup Language (HTML), Cascading Style Sheets
(CSS), and Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) inside a web browser. Data is bound to a
Document Object Model (DOM) and transformed to display various visualizations. The
D3 library is especially appropriate for visualizing digital forensic data considering its
ability to support large datasets with a relatively small overhead (Bostock, 2014).
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Figure 8 shown below contains an example of a Bubble Chart visualization. This
particular image depicts the frequency of words contained in the D3 JavaScript website
homepage (www.d3js.org). Larger bubbles represent words that occur more often than
others.

Figure 8. Bubble Chart of D3 Homepage (Bostock, 2014).

Figure 9 illustrates the political contributions for the 2012 Election Cycle using colored
bubble nodes to represent the candidates and arc slices to represent each Political Action
Committee (PAC). Bubble and path sizes are proportional to contribution amounts from
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PACs to political candidates. Interaction with the visualization allows the user to explore
datasets from both the House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate.

Figure 9. Political Contributions 2012 Visualization (Brightpoint, 2014).

Figure 10 provides a static image from another interactive visualization which details
historical data from the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations
(NASDAQ) stock exchange. This example demonstrates the ability of the D3 JavaScript
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Library to portray multiple visualizations including histograms, bar charts, pie charts, and
circle graphs in one interactive view.
For the purposes of this research, the D3 JavaScript library was selected to create
interactive visualization. The main advantage to utilizing D3 is its ability to run in most
web browsers making the tool developed in Chapter 3 extremely portable.

Figure 10. NASDAQ Interactive Chart (NASDAQ, 2014).
2.8

Summary
This chapter described the process of digital forensics with an emphasis on the

specific field of Forensic Memory Analysis. Topics discussed include the significance of
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memory analysis, methods of acquiring RAM dumps from Windows computers, and
open source memory artifact extraction tools. The applied science of Information
Visualization is explored as a possible solution for overcoming some of the challenges
associated with large and complex datasets. Both the Gephi software package and the D3
JavaScript library are examined as potential interactive visualization tools. D3 is
ultimately selected for use in this research due to its versatility and portability.
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III. Methodology
Various open-source programs exists which are capable of extracting digital
evidence from forensic memory dumps. While many of these tools provide textual output
to the user, locating key information in the digital evidence proves challenging. With the
increasing complexity of digital forensic collections, analysts find it difficult to
understand the unique state of the system at the time of memory capture. This research
applies Information Visualization techniques to the forensic memory analysis process by
providing analysts with both global and local views of the extracted data. The interactive
tool assists in identifying items of interest and recognizing behavior patterns in the data.
This chapter describes the specific goals of the research as well as the design
approach to achieving the outlined objectives. The process for obtaining forensic memory
captures from Windows systems is discussed and the method of extracting digital
artifacts is outlined. Additionally, the chapter provides the Information Visualization
tools and techniques used to develop an interactive tool for forensic memory analysis.
The basic functionality of the tool is covered in along with the specific features that
provide unique visual support to the user.
3.1

Research Objectives
The goal of this research is the development of a proof-of-concept model for

visualizing data extracted from a forensic memory image. The specific objectives are
outlined as follows:
1. Represent multiple datasets extracted from a forensic memory image in an
interactive visual with one universal view of the target system.
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2. Filter a global dataset for a particular system and visually express the
following associations:


The relationship between a specific system process and its associated
resources.



The relationship between a specific system resource and its associated
processes.

3. Assist in the visual identification of unique patterns and new pieces of
information from datasets.
3.2

Assumptions
Assumptions related to achieving the objectives include:
1. Digital forensic methods exist for obtaining an accurate physical memory image.
2. The extracted datasets under consideration for each system are limited to process
lists, network connections, system services, open file handles, system registry
keys, and loaded modules.
3. The operating systems under consideration is limited to Microsoft Windows XP.

3.3

System Design

Figure 11. Forensic Memory Analysis Process.
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Figure 11 illustrates the three step process for collecting, extracting, and
analyzing forensic memory images. The primary focus of this research is the third step of
the process which involves the development of a software tool capable of generating
interactive visualizations from datasets extracted from Windows RAM dumps. The
overall objective is to provide a functional system that is flexible enough to support
future datasets from various operating system platforms and architectures. Additionally,
the interface design should be simplistic and easy to use for both skilled and non-skilled
Digital Forensic Analysts. The visualization tool should have the ability to operate on a
range of workstation platforms used for forensic analysis.
3.3.1

Memory Acquisition

Several Windows-based computers provide the source memory data for testing
the visualization tool. Each machine is created and configured to produce unique process
activity. The test computers are VMWare virtual machines. Table 4 contains a summary
of the test machines and their configurations. Forensic memory dump acquisition is
performed via a software-based approach by running win32dd on each machine.
3.3.2

Malware Background

This section provides specific background information regarding the two types of
malware used in this research. The malware include FUTo and Poison Ivy, a Remote
Administration Tool (RAT).
Rootkits maintain access to a system by hiding their activity from the system user.
The FUTo rootkit, for example, removes references to itself from the active process list
data structures (Stevenson & Altholz, 2006). Unlike many rootkits that employ forms of
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Table 4. Test Machine Configurations.
Dataset Label

Operating System

Unique Process Activity

WinXP IE

Windows XP SP3

Active Internet Explorer
(v. 8.0.6001.18702) Process

WinXP Chrome

Windows XP SP3

Active Google Chrome
(v. 34.0.1847.131) Process

WinXP Firefox

Windows XP SP3

Active Mozilla Firefox
(v. 28.0) Process

WinXP Solitaire

Windows XP SP3

Active Solitaire Process

WinXP Word

Windows XP SP3

Active Microsoft Word Process

WinXP Malware 1

Windows XP SP3

FUTo Malware hiding Solitaire Process

WinXP Malware 2

Windows XP SP3

Remote Administration Tool
Malware (hidden)

WinXP Malware 3

Windows XP SP3

Remote Administration Tool Malware
(hidden using different process)

API-hooking, FUTo uses Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM) to directly modify
kernel structures including the PspCidTable (Silberman & C.H.A.O.S., 2005).
Poison Ivy is a Remote Administration Tool piece of malware that can perform
malicious activity such as “key logging, screen capturing, video capturing, file transfers,
password theft, system administration, traffic relaying, and more” (Bennett, et al, 2013).
Poison Ivy can also be configured to inject itself into a browser process. This allows the
RAT to effectively bypass the firewall and make outgoing connections at will.
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3.3.3

Forensic Data Extraction

Each forensic memory image is processed by the Volatility Framework (discussed
in Section 2.5.1) to extract digital artifacts. Table 5 lists the specific plugin modules
executed on each memory dump file. The tool exports each dataset as a text file which is
labeled according to content and source machine (i.e., Process_List_Chrome.txt,
Connections_Firefox.txt).
The images are also processed using the CMAT utility (see Section 2.6.2) to
extract data and generate the associated feature files. These feature files are compared
against the Volatility output files for discrepancies in the data. Unfortunately both CMAT
and Volatility lack the capability to extract data from a memory image relating to
Running Services. For the purposes of this research, the information is obtained via the
tasklist command-line tool included in Windows installations. The tool is executed
at the time of memory acquisition in order to obtain a complete dataset. Sample output is
depicted in Figure 12 below. Each listing is output to a text data file.

Table 5. Volatility Plugins Executed on Test Images.
Module Plugin

Description

connections

View the TCP connections active at the time of memory acquisition

handles

Display the list of open handles for all processes

pslist

List the active processes of the system

sockets

View the listening network sockets for any protocol
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C:\Users\Agent>tasklist /svc
Image Name
PID Services
========================= ======== ===================
System Idle Process
0 N/A
System
4 N/A
smss.exe
372 N/A
csrss.exe
504 N/A
wininit.exe
580 N/A
csrss.exe
604 N/A
services.exe
644 N/A
lsass.exe
664 KeyIso, Netlogon, SamSs
lsm.exe
696 N/A
winlogon.exe
744 N/A
svchost.exe
828 DcomLaunch, PlugPlay, Power
nvvsvc.exe
892 nvsvc
nvSCPAPISvr.exe
916 Stereo Service
svchost.exe
960 RpcEptMapper, RpcSs
MsMpEng.exe
160 MsMpSvc
svchost.exe
592 AudioSrv, Dhcp

Figure 12. tasklist Command-Line Output.

3.3.4

Data Formatting

The extracted datasets for each Memory Dump require conversion from text files
into the JSON format that can be used by the D3 JavaScript visualization software. This
is accomplished by importing each text file into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and
subsequently exporting as a comma separated values (CSV) file. Because this research is
a proof-of-concept, the design lacks an automated process for completing this task and
must be performed manually. The correctly formatted CSV output files are directly
imported into the Visualization tool described in the next section.
3.3.5

Visualization Tool Design

The tool developed in this thesis utilizes the D3 JavaScript visualization library to
manipulate HTML, CSS, and SVG objects within a web environment. The advantage of
utilizing JavaScript in an active web environment is the ability to use the visualization
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tool on most web browsers. For testing purposes the tool is hosted locally through a
simple Apache web server.
Table 6 contains a listing of the source files included in the visualization tool
working directory along with brief descriptions of each resource. The main effort of this
research involved writing and debugging the source files which contain approximately
four thousand lines of JavaScript code. The only source file not authored in this research
is the D3 JavaScript Library file. A sequence diagram outlining basic functionality of the
developed visualization tool is depicted in Figure 13.
Table 6. Visualization Tool Source Files.
File Name

Description

index.html

HTML source file

globals.js

Global variable definitions

buttons.js

Interactive button action definitions

initialize.js

Functions for initializing the interface

update.js

Functions for updating the visualization

get.js

Data accessor functions

events.js

Mouse click event functions

d3.v3.min.js

D3 JavaScript Library

style.css

File specifying CSS Style options
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3.3.6

Visualization Tool Layout

Figure 14 provides a view of the main user-interface with outlines highlighting
the three distinct regions of the interface. The top of the page contains a dataset selector
menu and multiple buttons. The center main region contains the interactive visualization
while the green pane on the right displays instruction and selected data details.

Dataset
Menu

Function Buttons

Interactive Visualization
Region

Instructions/
Details Pane

Figure 14. Visualization Interface Layout.
The interactive visualization region is divided into three major components (Figure 15):


Process Nodes – Hierarchical layout containing bubble nodes representing system
processes.



Resource Arcs – System resource lists divided into arcs and color coded
according to type which include File Handle, Key Handles, Loaded Modules,
Services, Ports, and Sockets.
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Links – Colored links connecting resources and their associated process nodes.

Resource Arcs

Process Nodes

Links

Figure 15. Visualization Region Components.
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3.4

Visualization Tool Functionality
This section provides steps detailing the basic functions of the visualization tool.
3.4.1

Dataset Selection and Initialization

The following steps are used to select and initialize datasets:
1. Click the drop-down menu and select a dataset.
2. Click the Fetch Data button to import the appropriate CSV data files.
3. Click Initialize Data button to initiate the interactive visualization.
3.4.2

Visualization Interaction

The visualization tool is designed to follow a process flow similar to the Explore,
Investigate, and Correlate (EIP) Process described in Chapter 2. Upon initialization, the
visualization depicts a high-level global view of the system. The resource arcs are
populated with a complete listing of system resources which the user can Explore by
clicking to expand as shown in Figure 16.
Interacting with the visualization allows the user to Investigate areas of interest by
means of process node highlighting and resource arc slice filtering. The resulting local
view provides a low-level perspective of the system by displaying the connections
between processes and resources. By investigating areas of interest, the user discovers
highlighted relationships within the datasets. This can be accomplished in three ways:
1.

Clicking on a Process Bubble Node (see Figure 17)


Process Node is highlighted.



Resource arcs are filtered to list files, keys, modules, services, ports,
and sockets associated with the selected process.
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2.

Clicking on a Resource Slice (see Figure 18)


3.

Process Nodes accessing selected resources are highlighted.

Clicking the Apply Resource Filter button (see Figure 19)


Resource arcs are filtered to contain all open ports, open sockets,
user files, and executable loaded modules for all system processes.

The final feature of the visualization allows users to both highlight specific
relationships as well as identify behavior patterns by overlaying colored links from an
expanded list of resource slices to all related process nodes. This is accomplished by
selecting the Toggle Links button at the top of the interface while in an expanded
resource list view (i.e., currently viewing expanded Sockets List) as shown in Figure 20.
This mechanism assists the user in discovering Correlations within the data through
visual aids.
Additional features of the visualization include:


Tooltips displaying process names on mouse over



Tooltips displaying full resource labels on mouse over



Process summary data displayed in green data details pane when
node selected (see Figure 17)
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Figure 16. Expanded Resource Arc – Sockets List.
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Figure 17. Process Bubble Selected – Resource Arcs Filtered.
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Figure 19. Apply Resource Filter Button Selected.
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3.5

Summary
This chapter outlined the research objectives and specific design approach to

accomplishing those goals. The process for obtaining forensic memory captures from
Windows machines is discussed along with the techniques used to extract digital artifacts
from the dumps. The two types of malware that exist in the test memory dumps are
reviewed to outline their basic behavioral characteristics.
The last portion of the chapter provides a functional overview of the Visualization
tool user interface. Basic features of the software are presented including the global
system view and potential user interactions resulting in a more local view of the system.
The addition of visual links to connect resources and associated processes assists the user
in locating unique patterns and information of significance within the digital forensic
datasets.
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IV. Analysis and Results
In order to assess the abilities of the visualization tool developed in this research,
test forensic memory images are created and acquired. The forensic memory analysis
tools previously described are then executed to extract digital artifacts from the dumps.
The resulting datasets are formatted using Microsoft Excel for import into the
visualization tool.
This chapter describes the application of the D3 JavaScript Visualization tool to
various test datasets acquired from a number of Windows XP memory dumps. The results
from each of the sample datasets are evaluated against the three research goals. The first
goal involves providing a global view of the data that is extracted from forensic memory
dumps using memory analysis tools. The second goal requires that the visualization tool
possess the ability to filter the forensic datasets and highlight two types of relationships.
These include the association between a process and its corresponding resources, and the
connections between a particular resource and the processes accessing it. The third goal
states that the visualization tool should contain features that assist the user in identifying
unique patterns and interesting items within the datasets. Each objective is discussed in
detail in the following sections.
4.1

Goal 1: Global View of Data from Memory Analysis Tools
The first goal requires the visualization tool provide an interactive global view of

the data output from forensic memory image analysis tools. Ultimately this visualization
should allow the user to explore the entire set of available information extracted from a
memory capture.
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The visualization tool meets this objective by:


Providing a global view of the target system based on the datasets
extracted from the respective memory dump.



Populating the resource arcs with lists of complete system resources based
on six categories (files, registry keys, loaded modules, services, ports, and
sockets).



Allowing the user to explore the resources by expanding/reducing each
resource arc slice.

This goal is met by the full process hierarchy (node layout) and global resource listing
(expandable arcs) as shown in Figure 21. For this particular dataset there are a total of 34
processes, 374 unique file handles, 268 registry key handles, 349 loaded modules, 44
active services, 3 open ports, and 15 open sockets which populate the visualization.

Global View containing
Full Process Node
Hierarchy and Fully
Populated Resource
Arcs.

Users explore full
listing of global
resources by expanding
each colored arc.

Figure 21. Overall System View.
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4.2

Goal 2: Filter Data and Display Relationships
The second goal states that the visualization tool should possess the ability to

filter the datasets and highlight the relationship between:


A single process and its associated resources (Figure 22)



A single resource and its associated processes (Figure 23)

These goals are evidently satisfied as portrayed by the selected process and associated
resource arcs (Figure 22) as well as the selected loaded module resource and associated
processes (Figure 23).
The purpose of this objective is to understand the behavior of the system by
visualizing the low-level connections between objects. It is through this local view of the
data that relevant information is discovered.
4.3

Goal 3: Assist in Identifying New Data and Patterns
The third research goal states that the visualization tool should assist the user in

identifying unique patterns and new pieces of information within the datasets. To verify
this objective, each dataset contains unique process activity at the time of memory
capture (see Table 4). There are two methods that can be applied to spot unique activity
or new data:
1.

Toggle links to display multiple resource relationships (limited to single
resource type) in one view.

2.

Compare trusted system visualization (containing only legitimate process
activity) to an untrusted system visualization (containing a hidden process,
rootkit, or other malware).
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Figure 22. Visualization filtered for single process.
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Figure 23. Visualization filtered for single resource.
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Four datasets are labeled as trusted systems running a single instance of a
legitimate process while three other datasets contain some form of malware. The above
methods are applied to evaluate the third overall research goal.
4.3.1

Windows XP SP3 (Internet Explorer) – Trusted Image

The first memory image consists of a single instance of Internet Explorer running
on a Windows XP SP3 machine. Applying the unique resource filter provides a list of
connections (ports and sockets), user files, and loaded modules. Clicking on the Socket
and Port Resource arcs populates the resource ring with the respective resource lists.
Using method 1 from above, toggling the links when viewing both lists produce
visualizations that provides the user with some unique patterns (see Figures 24, 25).
There are numerous connections surrounding one particular process, which upon
examination is the IEXPLORER.EXE process running inside another instance of
IEXPLORER.EXE.
Filtering the global resource list by clicking the Apply Resource Filter button and
selecting the red loaded modules arc slice populates the resource ring with the list of
executable loaded modules. Toggling the links for this list provides another view (see
Figure 26). By browsing this short list the user can identify the iexplorer.exe
module and verify that it is loaded by the appropriate IEXPLORE.EXE process node.
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4.3.2

Windows XP SP3 (Google Chrome) – Trusted Image

The second memory image is from a Windows XP machine executing a single
instance of Google Chrome. Applying the unique resource filter provides a list of
connections (ports and sockets), user files, and loaded modules. Clicking on the Socket
and Port Resource arcs populates the resource ring with the respective resource lists.
Using method 1 and clicking the Toggle Links button when viewing each list provides the
user with unique visualizations (see Figures 27, 28). The cluster of CHROME.EXE nodes
can be identified by three socket connections, as well as the only three active open ports
on the system.
Filtering the global resource list by clicking the Apply Resource Filter button and
selecting the red loaded modules arc slice populates the resource ring with the list of
executable loaded modules. Toggling the links for this list provides another view (see
Figure 29). By browsing this short list the user can identify the chrome.exe module
and verify that it is loaded by the appropriate CHROME.EXE process node as indicated
by the highlighted node cluster.
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4.3.3

Windows XP SP3 (Mozilla Firefox) – Trusted Source

The third trusted memory dump is from a Windows XP machine executing a single
instance of Mozilla Firefox. Applying the unique resource filter provides a list of
connections (ports and sockets), user files, and loaded modules. Clicking on the Socket
and Port Resource arcs populates the resource ring with the respective resource lists.
Applying method 1 and clicking the Toggle Links button when viewing each list provides
the user with unique visualizations (see Figures 30, 31). An instance of PLUGINCONTAINER.EXE is running inside a FIREFOX.EXE process node and can be
identified by eleven socket connections, as well as the only eleven active open ports on
the system.
Filtering the global resource list by clicking the Apply Resource Filter button and
selecting the red loaded modules arc slice populates the resource ring with the list of
executable loaded modules. Toggling the links for this list provides another view (see
Figure 32). By browsing this short list the user can identify the firefox.exe and
plugin-container.exe modules and verify that they are loaded by the appropriate
FIREFOX.EXE and PLUGIN_CONTAINER.EXE process nodes as indicated by the
highlighted nodes.
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4.3.4

Windows XP SP3 (Solitaire) – Trusted Source

The fourth trusted memory image is from a Windows XP machine executing a
single instance of Solitaire. Again the unique resource filter provides a list of connections
(ports and sockets), user files, and loaded modules. Clicking on the Socket Resource arc
populates the resource ring with the respective resource list. Applying method 1 and
clicking the Toggle Links button when viewing the socket list provides the user with the
visualization in Figure 33, however, none of the sockets are connected to the SOL.EXE
process. There are no open ports and therefore no associated unique visualization.
Filtering the global resource list by clicking the Apply Resource Filter button and
selecting the red loaded modules arc slice populates the resource ring with the list of
executable loaded modules. Toggling the links for this list provides another view (see
Figure 34). By browsing this short list the user can identify the sol.exe module and
verify that they it is loaded by the appropriate SOL.EXE process as indicated by the
highlighted node.
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4.3.5

Windows XP SP3 (Word) – Trusted Source

The fifth trusted memory image is from a Windows XP machine executing a
single instance of Microsoft Word. The unique resource filter provides a list of sockets,
user files, and loaded modules. There are no open ports in this dataset. The Word process
is discovered by exploring the node layout as seen in Figure 35. Applying method 1 and
clicking the Toggle Links button when viewing the files list provides the user with the
visualization in Figure 36. This visualization lists many items including the open
document (.docx), a Word template (Normal.dotm), a picture file (.jpeg), and various
temp files. The combination of the .docx file residing in the users directory and the temp
files reflects the fact that the document was in the process of being edited at the moment
of memory capture.
One of the objectives for digital forensic practitioners is to gain an insight into the
specific user activity on a target device through analysis of the collection data. This
particular test dataset provides an example of how the interactive visualization could
prove useful to an analyst in identifying specific document editing activity. The same
technique could be used to locate other instances of user activity such as recent web
browsing, email editing, social networking, peer-to-peer file exchanges, and multimedia
viewing. This information is valuable to digital forensic investigators looking to develop
an activity profile of the system user.
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4.3.6

Windows XP SP3 (Malware 1)

The sixth memory dump tested is from a Windows XP machine executing an
instance of the FUTo malware. The unique resource filter provides a list of connections
(ports and sockets), user files, and loaded modules. Clicking on the Socket Resource arc
populates the resource ring with the respective resource list. Applying method 1 and
clicking the Toggle Links button when viewing the socket list provides the user with the
visualization in Figure 37. Although examination does not provide any immediate
observations, comparison with previous trusted examples reveals a similarity with the
Solitaire image in the socket list link layout pattern (see Figures 33, 37). Closer
inspection uncovers the only difference, namely, the absence of a SOL.EXE process
node in the malware sample. There are no open ports and therefore no associated unique
visualization.
The FUTo malware (discussed in Section 3.3.2) hides an active process by
removing references to it in various kernel data structures. Since the process list extracted
from memory is generated by walking these data structures, the hidden process will not
appear as a node and instead exist as a loaded module attached to a system process. A
review of the loaded modules for the System Idle Process reveals a sol.exe
module connected to it (see Figure 38). Under normal circumstances, the System
Idle Process would not load the Microsoft Solitaire program as a module. From this
verification, there is sufficient evidence to categorize this as a potential implementation
of a rootkit.
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Figure 37. Malware 1 – Socket List Links.
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4.3.7

Windows XP SP3 (Malware 2)

This seventh dump image also has some form of malware operating on the system
at the time of memory acquisition. Applying the unique resources filter and toggling the
links for each resource list provides the views shown in Figures 39, 40, and 41
respectively.
Examination of the socket list with links does not seem to display any unique
patterns or trends visually. The port list with links shows one active connection to a
process named IEXPLORE.EXE.
If method 2 is applied, this dataset should be compared to a similar trusted image.
Since a process named IEXPLORE.EXE is listed it is compared to the trusted IE dataset
from the previous section.
A few observations can be made:


The single connection to IEXPLORE.EXE in the malware dataset differs from
the numerous connections seen in the trusted dataset (see Figures 24, 25).



The iexplore.exe loaded module that appears in the trusted dataset appears
differently in the Malware 2 set as IEXPLORE.EXE (see Figure 26).

Using these observations it can be deduced that the malware in this dataset is probably
masquerading as an instance of IE. In Section 3.3.2, the Poison Ivy Remote
Administration Tool (RAT) is discussed as a form of malware. A key behavior of Poison
Ivy is its ability to inject itself into a browser process. Considering the single connection
to this process we can classify this as a potential RAT signature.
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4.3.8

Windows XP SP3 (Malware 3)

The final forensic memory image also contains malware operating on the system
at the time of memory acquisition. Filtering for unique resources and toggling the links
for each resource list provides the views shown in Figures 42, 43, and 44.
Examination of the socket list visualization with links does not seem to display
any unique patterns or trends. It does bear a close resemblance to the socket layout from
the Malware 2 dataset (see Figure 39). The ports list, however, shows only one
connection which is attached to an msmsgs.exe process node. The MSMSGS.EXE process
appears in multiple datasets and appears to be a legitimate process but does not have any
connections in any of the trusted samples (see Figure 45 from trusted Solitaire dataset).
This observation coupled with the single connection reveals a pattern that can be treated
as a possible instance of RAT malware similar to the Malware 2 dataset
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4.4

Summary
This chapter applies the D3 JavaScript Visualization tool to various test datasets

extracted from a number of Windows XP memory dumps. The results from the eight
sample datasets are evaluated against the three research goals outlined in Chapter 1. The
first objective requires the developed visualization tool provide a global view of the data
that is extracted from forensic memory dumps using memory analysis tools. The second
goal expects the tool to possess the ability to filter datasets and highlight two key
relationships within the data. The first is the relationship between a process and its
associated resources, while the second is the relationship between a particular resource
and its corresponding process nodes. The final objective of the research requires the
visualization tool contain features that assist the user in locating behavior patterns and
unique items of relevance within the datasets.
Five of the Windows memory captures contain legitimate (trusted) process
activity while three datasets contain malware. Evaluation of the trusted datasets provides
profiles of legitimate process activity that can be compared against malware datasets. By
applying the features of the visualization tool, FUTo malware activity is located in the
Malware 1 dataset while instances of the Poison Ivy Remote Administration Tool are
detected in both the Malware 2 and Malware 3 datasets.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
The proof-of-concept visualization tool developed in this research is shown to
provide a level of assistance to forensic investigators in the discovery of new data and
existing patterns. The specific objectives for this research outlined in Chapter 1 are as
follows:
1. The visualization tool should provide an interactive global view of the data
output from forensic memory image analysis tools.
2. The visualization tool should have the ability to filter the datasets for a
particular system and visually represent the following associations:


The relationship between each process and its associated resources.



The relationship between a system resource and its associated
processes.

3. The visualization tool should assist the user in locating unique patterns and
information of relevance within the datasets.
By addressing the overall problem statement and meeting the research objectives listed
above, it can be implied that the thesis research is successful.
5.1

Research Accomplishments
This research obtained forensic memory images from Windows XP machines and

developed an interactive software tool that graphically represents the extracted datasets
using Information Visualization techniques. Multiple systems containing forms of
malware were analyzed using the developed visualization tool to discover specific
behavior patterns and attempt to identify the type of malware. The visualization tool
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created using D3 JavaScript is capable of running on virtually any platform due to its
web-based design making it completely portable for use in the field.
5.2

Future Work
One shortcoming of the visualization tool developed in this research is its

limitation to a single data input format. The JavaScript source code for this project is
specifically tailored to import data files that are in a particular format (CSV). One web
blog describes a method of using an SQL database to generate datasets based on queries
(D3noob, 2013). Streamlining both the collection and digital artifact extraction processes
into one automated routine would improve the overall usability and increase the speed of
analysis.
One potential method of improving the visualization and location of items of
interest in large datasets could involve the whitelisting of trusted processes and resources.
Placing less emphasis on trusted objects may help digital forensic analysts focus on the
important data contained in a particular collection.
A useful addition to the visualization tool would involve the automatic detection
of hidden processes similar to the FUTo and RAT malware discovered in Chapter 4. By
understanding the behavior of certain process hiding mechanisms, the tool could filter
and search the data to identify such cases and highlight the responsible process nodes and
resources respectively.
While the eight datasets tested in this research utilize the Window XP operating
system, the visualization tool can also be applied to datasets from Windows 7 forensic
memory images as shown in Figure 46. CMAT is used to perform the extraction of digital
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artifacts from the dump due to the limited number of Volatility plugin modules currently
compatible with Windows 7 architecture.
The digital forensic visualization methods used in this research can also be ported
to various operating systems including Mac OS X, Linux, and Android. A prototype
model for an Android 4.3 memory dump was developed during the course of this
research but includes a limited feature set. Figure 47 contains a screen capture of the
Android process node layout. Since both Android and Linux are fairly similar in
architecture, it would appear fairly simple to modify the system to accept datasets from
both operating systems.
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Figure 46. Windows 7 Dataset Visualization.
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Figure 47. Android 4.3 Dataset Visualization (Prototype).
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